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Federal Protections
for “Fur-Babies”:
A Legislative Proposal
Abstract
Americans love their animals, but America doesn’t protect them.
Across the country, animals continue to be classified as mere property, undeserving of any basic rights and unprotected by the animal
welfare statutes that do exist, but often remain unenforced. This
Article proposes a comprehensive animal protection system that includes the following components: (a) general prohibitions against
animal crushing, cruelty, neglect, and abuse; (b) a civil action provision that will allow humane society officers to investigate violations of those prohibitions; (c) a provision establishing animal legal
advocates to work alongside the officers and prosecute violations;
and (d) an animal-suit provision to grant abused animals standing
to sue the convicted abuser for damages to pay for medical costs or
other costs of care.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2017, a concerned neighbor found a victim of abuse starved and severely emaciated, consumed by scabs, lice, infection, and frost bite, and suffering from genital nerve damage and potential paralysis.1 The victim’s
abuser pled guilty to misdemeanor neglect and was sentenced to community
service.2 According to current laws, the abuser is not liable for damages, including medical expenses or other costs of care, and will suffer no other criminal or civil repercussions.3 Although the victim suffered a traumatic experience and serious medical procedures will exhaust his foreseeable future, he
has no legal remedy and will only survive from the kindness and donations of
others.4 The abuser is absolved from serious responsibility because the victim
is a horse.5 The fact that the abuser was convicted and sentenced under an
animal protection statute is actually quite an anomaly.6 Across the United
States, the number of animal abuse cases prosecuted is miniscule compared to
the number of reported animal abuse instances.7 The act of abusing an animal
is not federally prohibited until the abuse causes severe bodily injury and affects foreign or interstate commerce.8
In stark contrast to the nation’s legal treatment of nonhuman animals,9
Americans are more enthralled with their animal companions than ever before.10 In 2018 alone, Americans spent more than seventy-two billion dollars
1. Complaint at 4–6, Justice v. Vercher, No. 18CV17601 (Or. May 1, 2018) [hereinafter Justice
Complaint].
2. Oregon v. Vercher, No. 17CR36590 (Or. Cir. Ct. 2017).
3. See infra Section IV.C.
4. Justice Complaint, supra note 1, at 5–8.
5. See, e.g., id. at 9–10.
6. Symposium, Animal Advocacy and Causes of Action, 13 ANIMAL L. 87, 118–19 (2006).
7. Id. at 119. For example, Massachusetts (as of 2003) only prosecuted about three percent of
reported animal abuse cases. See Jennifer H. Rackstraw, Reaching for Justice: An Analysis of SelfHelp Prosecution for Animal Crimes, 9 ANIMAL L. 243, 246 (2003). According to Prosecutor Sara
Swanson (Benzie County, Michigan), animal abuse cases “tend to be handled more out of the court
system,” and even if the cases are thoroughly investigated, they are rarely sent to her office for prosecution. Mardi Link, Animal Cruelty on the Rise, TRAVERSE CITY REC. EAGLE (Sept. 9, 2018),
https://www.record-eagle.com/news/local_news/animal-cruelty-on-the-rise/article_73e5ee26-43c75673-af11-aba74e892d5a.html.
8. Niraj Chokshi, There’s No Federal Ban on Animal Cruelty. Lawmakers Want to Change That.,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/30/us/animal-cruelty-bill-felony.
html; see also infra Section IV.A (discussing the newly enacted animal cruelty prevention prohibition).
9. To be concise, this Article refers to nonhuman animals as “animals.”
10. See infra notes 36–38 and accompanying text.
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on their pets, and that number is estimated to surge.11 Pet owners are also
beginning to show more empathy for companion animals and pay more attention to the animal protection movements that have been working behind the
scenes for decades.12 Animal rights organizations, such as the Nonhuman
Rights Project, are vigilantly fighting to change the legal classification of animals from property to legal persons in order to recognize that animals have
rights in and of themselves.13 Animal welfare organizations are more willing
to compromise to accept animal-related statutes that do not necessarily recognize animal rights, but do provide immediate necessary protections.14 One
such animal welfare statute, the Endangered Species Act, encourages citizens—through a citizen-suit provision—to compel government enforcement
of the protections contained within the Act to further protect animals.15 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court stripped the intended authority from the citizen-suit provision by requiring that plaintiffs satisfy a strict injury-in-fact test
before their case can be heard.16
As seen in other areas of law, Congress may grant a private right of action
to narrow classes of potential plaintiffs to circumvent the Court’s injury-infact test.17 Before doing so, Congress should look to state animal protection
statutes for guidance on building effective federal legislation.18 To set the
stage for a federal legislative proposal, Part II of this Article recounts animal
11. See Press Release, American Pet Products Association, Americans Are Spending More on Pets
Than Ever Before: $72 Billion (Mar. 21, 2019) https://www.americanpetproducts.org/press_releasedetail.asp?id=191; Mickey Meece, American Families Spent Estimated $75 Billion on Pets in
2019: Report, NY POST (Dec. 14, 2019, 11:27 PM), https://nypost.com/2019/12/14/american-families-spent-estimated-75-billion-on-pets-in-2019-report/?utm_campaign=applenews&utm_medium=inline&utm_source=applenews; Kerry Lengyel, American Pet Spending Reaches New High,
VETERINARIAN’S MONEY DIG. (Mar. 24, 2018), https://www.vmdtoday.com/news/american-petspending-reaches-new-high (discussing the almost seventy billion dollars owners spent on their pets
in 2017).
12. See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Animals as More than “Mere Things,” but Still Property: A Call for
Continuing Evolution of the Animal Welfare Paradigm, 84 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1031 (2016) [hereinafter Cupp, Mere Things]; see also Stanley Coren, Why People Sometimes Care More About Dogs
Than Humans, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/caninecorner/201711/why-people-sometimes-care-more-about-dogs-humans.
13. See infra Sections III.A, III.B.1.
14. See infra Sections III.A., III.B.2.
15. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. (2012); see infra Section III.B.2.
16. See Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572–74 (1992); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154,
163 (1997); infra Section III.B.2.
17. See infra Section III.B.2.
18. See infra Part IV.
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uses throughout history and illustrates America’s evolving attitude toward
companion animals.19 Part III delves deeper into the differences between animal rights arguments and animal welfare proposals and the fights for legal
personhood or legal standing for animals.20 Part IV of this Article introduces
a recent federal prohibition and samples animal protections from three states
to provide a layout of what may or may not work in a more comprehensive
federal system.21 Part V combines and adjusts the sampled state provisions to
propose a four-part approach to potential federal animal cruelty legislation.22
Lastly, Part VI concludes.23
II. A HISTORY OF ANIMAL USE
Humanity’s use of animals for food, clothing, transportation, etc.
stretches back to the beginning of civilization.24 In the Old Testament, God
tells humans to “[r]ule over the fish in the sea and the birds in the sky and over
every living creature that moves on the ground.”25 Over 12,000 years ago,
hunter-gatherer societies, true to the name, survived by hunting, fishing, and
scavenging.26 Correspondingly, the classification of animals as human property has origins in ancient legal systems.27 For instance, in ancient Rome, a
person who captured a wild animal simultaneously secured property rights to
that animal.28 Due to the immense value placed upon ownership of an animal
19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra Part IV. In November 2019, Congress enacted the Preventing Animal Cruelty and
Torture Act to prohibit animal crushing. See infra Section IV.A. The three sampled states are Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Oregon. See infra Sections IV.B–D. Connecticut allows animal advocates
to assist prosecutors in cases concerning the custody or welfare of cats and dogs. See infra Section
IV.B. Pennsylvania allows humane societies to privately employ officers who have authority to investigate and prosecute animal cruelty cases. See infra Section IV.C. Lastly, Oregon courts have
determined that an animal can be classified as the victim of a crime. See infra Section IV.D.
22. See infra Part V.
23. See infra Part VI.
24. STEVEN M. WISE, DRAWING THE LINE: SCIENCE AND THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 17–21
(2002) [hereinafter WISE, DRAWING THE LINE].
25. Genesis 1:28 (New Int’l Version).
26. Emma Groeneveld, Prehistoric Hunter-Gatherer Societies, ANCIENT HIST. ENCYCLOPEDIA
(Dec. 9, 2016), https://www.ancient.eu/article/991/.
27. See Steven M. Wise, The Legal Thinghood of Nonhuman Animals, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 471, 476–505 (1996) [hereinafter Wise, The Legal Thinghood] (explaining the characterization
of animals through ancient Mesopotamian, Hebrew, Greek, and Roman civilizations).
28. Richard A. Epstein, The Modern Uses of Ancient Law, 48 S.C. L. REV. 243, 245 (1997).
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in many ancient societies,29 legal remedies for destruction or theft of a person’s animal were often intricate and precise, allowing collection of both compensatory and punitive damages.30 For example, a section of the ancient Mesopotamian Code of Hammurabi31 explained different compensation schemes
depending on whether the animal at issue was the property of an individual or
an institution.32
Centuries later, modern legal systems continue to classify animals as
property although the relationship between many owners and animals has
transformed.33 Similar to the circumstances in ancient civilizations, citizens
of developing nations primarily use animals to provide for basic human needs
such as food, transportation, or a source of income for impoverished people.34
Accordingly, the consequences of reclassifying animals in a developing nation are perhaps too dire to consider right now.35 In America, however, many
29. Cupp, Mere Things, supra note 12, at 1028 (“[F]or many ancients, animals may have been the
most valuable property they owned.”).
30. Id. at 1028 n.9 (“If anyone uncovers a pit or digs one and fails to cover it and an ox or a donkey
falls into it, the one who opened the pit must pay the owner for the loss and take the dead animal in
exchange. If anyone’s bull injures someone else’s bull and it dies, the two parties are to sell the live
one and divide both the money and the dead animal equally. However, if it was known that the bull
had the habit of goring, yet the owner did not keep it penned up, the owner must pay, animal for
animal, and take the dead animal in exchange . . . . Anyone who steals must certainly make restitution,
but if they have nothing, they must be sold to pay for their theft. If the stolen animal is found alive in
their possession—whether ox or donkey or sheep—they must pay back double.” (quoting Exodus
21:33–36; 22:3–4 (New Int’l Version))).
31. The Code of Hammurabi is a set of 282 rules, proclaimed by the Babylonian King Hammurabi,
who reigned from 1792 to 1750 B.C.E. Code of Hammurabi, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Code-of-Hammurabi (last visited Oct. 27, 2019). The Code was
one of the earliest and most complete written legal codes and included commercial and judicial standards. Id.
32. The Code of Hammurabi, AVALON PROJECT (L.W. King, trans.), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
ancient/hamframe.asp (last visited Oct. 27, 2019) (“If any one steal cattle or sheep, or an ass, or a pig
or a goat, if it belong to a god or to the court, the thief shall pay thirtyfold therefor; if they belonged
to a freed man of the king he shall pay tenfold; if the thief has nothing with which to pay he shall be
put to death.”).
33. See GARY L. FRANCIONE, INTRODUCTION TO ANIMAL RIGHTS: YOUR CHILD OR THE DOG? xix
(2000) [hereinafter FRANCIONE, INTRO TO ANIMAL RIGHTS] (providing statistics from the 1990s about
owners’ attitudes towards their pets); see also Cupp, Mere Things, supra note 12, at 1029–30 (“Simply
calling animals ‘property’ undervalues our evolving sense of their appropriate status . . . . Many of us
tend to think of our companion animals as members of our families, and treating companion animals
as property akin to a table or a chair would be odious to caring owners.”).
34. Cupp, Mere Things, supra note 12, at 1028–29.
35. Id. at 1029. Richard L. Cupp, Jr. is a Professor of Law at Pepperdine Caruso School of Law.
Id. at 1023. As seen throughout this Article, Cupp writes and speaks extensively about the legal and
moral status of animals and is widely recognized as a leading scholar within the field. Id. He argues
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domestic animals are generally seen as companions and treated as part of the
family, rather than a resource.36 Increased litigation throughout America
seeking non-economic damages—such as punitive or emotional distress damages—for a tortious killing of a companion animal provides evidence that
Americans consider their animals to be more than simple property.37 In addition to requesting recognition from the legal sphere for emotional attachment
to their animals, pet owners spend record amounts of money to provide a
happy life for their lovingly nicknamed “fur-babies.”38 In 2018, 79% of millennial, pet-owning homebuyers considered their pet’s needs before buying
their home and said they would refuse an otherwise perfect home if the pet’s

that:
The implications of abandoning the property status of animals would be staggering, not
only for fighting diseases and sustaining the economies of First World nations, but also,
absent dramatic changes that do not seem likely in the foreseeable future, for the very survival of many people living at subsistence levels in the Third World.
Id. at 1029. Perhaps staggering changes in first-world nations are exactly the push needed in order to
force market changes toward more sustainable and morally appropriate practices. See id. Negative
externalities such as global warming, destruction of land, and animal abuse could be curtailed by first
reclassifying animals in first-world nations, and only following in third world countries after new,
sustainable practices have been developed and executed, thereby minimizing the effect on impoverished people. Id.
36. FRANCIONE, INTRO TO ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 33, at xix; see also Richard L. Cupp, Jr.,
Focusing on Human Responsibility Rather Than Legal Personhood for Nonhuman Animals, 33 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 517, 526 (2016) [hereinafter Cupp, Human Responsibility] (“Most of us view the
animals in our lives as in terms of affection rather than as financial assets.”); Maneesha Deckha, Vulnerability, Equality, and Animals, 27 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 47, 51 (2015) (“A good number [of individuals who live with animals] might even claim that their relationship with their companion animals
is their most meaningful one.”).
37. See, e.g., Strickland v. Medlen, 397 S.W.3d 184, 192–93 (Tex. 2013) (rejecting a claim for
additional damages above market value of the companion animal); Kimes v. Grosser, 126 Cal. Rptr.
3d 581, 582 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (allowing an owner to collect punitive damages for intentionally
inflicted injury to a companion animal); see also Henry Mark Holzer, Harming Companion Animals:
Liability and Damages, ANIMAL L. COALITION (Aug. 30, 2008), https://animallawcoalition.com/
harming-companion-animals-liability-and-damages/ (“[T]he overwhelming refusal of American civil
courts to allow more than market value damages in the cases of veterinary malfeasance [or in cases of
intentional harm] presents two main problems. First, there is the equity, or fairness, issue: whereby
human victims of veterinary negligence are not fully compensated for the emotional and financial
investments made in their companion animals.” (quoting Christopher Green, The Future of Veterinary
Malpractice Liability in the Care of Companion Animals, 10 ANIMAL L. 163, 192 (2004))).
38. Chris Lange, National Pet Month: Here’s How Much Millennials Spend on Their Pets, USA
TODAY (May 22, 2018, 11:11 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/budgetand-spending/2018/05/22/how-much-millennials-spend-on-pets/34900989/; see also Lengyel, supra
note 11 (detailing the year-on-year increase regarding pet-related spending, which reached almost $70
billion in 2017); Meece, supra note 11 (estimating $75 billion in pet-related spending during 2019).
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needs were not met.39 In fact, many pet owners are so enthralled with each
other’s animals (and their own, of course), that an industry of animal social
media influencers is thriving and may even be compared to the influential
power of some celebrities.40
39. See Diana Olick, Millennials Put Pets First When Buying a Home, CNBC (Aug. 31, 2018,
10:36 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/31/millennials-put-pets-first-when-buying-a-home.html;
see also Hillary Hoffower, Raising Kids Is So Expensive in America that Millennials Are Prioritizing
Their Pets Instead and Dropping Up to $400 on Designer Dog Clothes, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 19, 2019,
9:49 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/millennials-buy-high-end-dog-clothes-prioritize-petsover-kids-2019-3 (recognizing how many millennials are “treating their pets as if they were kids and
devoting a growing share of their disposable income to them”); Rachel Lewis, Millennials Are Buying
Homes Because of Their Dogs—Not Their Children or Marriages, MONEY (July 27, 2017),
http://money.com/money/4876151/millenials-homes-dogs-children-marriages/ (“[A] third of millennials who had already purchased their first home said they were influenced by the need to have space
for a dog.”); Jennifer Liu, More Young People are Buying Homes That Cater To Their Dog’s Lifestyle,
FORBES (Aug. 11, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/learnvest/2017/08/11/young-homebuyers-are-moving-because-of-their-dogs/#716fabc11575 (“[A]s far as our companions, dogs had
more weight in homebuying than any other human counterpart.”).
40. See Paula Froelich, Adoring Crowds Pounce on Celebrity Pets at PetCon in NYC, NY POST
(Dec. 14, 2019, 4:54 PM) https://nypost.com/2019/12/14/adoring-crowds-pounce-on-celebrity-petsat-petcon-in-nyc/; Chavie Lieber, How to Make Your Dog Instagram-Famous, According to a Manager for “Pet Influencers,” VOX (Nov. 6, 2018, 10:09 AM), https://www.vox.com/the-goods/
2018/11/6/18066056/dog-instagram-famous-pet-influencers; Nicole Spector, Social Media Users
Post About Their Dogs Six Times Per Week, NBC NEWS (Jan. 19, 2017, 5:08 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/social-media/social-media-users-post-about-their-dogs-six-timesweek-n708751. Many animal influencers use their vast followings to promote brands, sell their own
products, or even land publishing deals for books or calendars. The Top 15 Pet Influencers Whose
Instagram Followings Speak for Themselves, MEDIAKIX, http://mediakix.com/2018/11/top-pet-influencers-instagram-best-popular/#gs.1ukkh2 (last visited Oct. 27, 2019). One such influencer, Doug the
Pug (@itsdougthepug), caters to close to ten million followers across Instagram, Facebook, Twitter,
and Snapchat and a has net worth of over $500,000. Doug the Pug, ECELEBRITYFACTS (Aug. 15,
2017, 12:49 PM), https://ecelebrityfacts.com/doug-the-pug-net-worth; Becky Hughes, Go Behind-theScenes at Doug the Pug’s Nashville Home, PARADE (July 5, 2017, 1:00 PM), https://parade.com/583847/beckyhughes/at-home-with-doug-the-pug/. Some pet owners and animal shelters
work with “foster parents” who use social media accounts to bring awareness and raise money for
shelter animals or animals that they are currently trying to find homes for. See, e.g., The Misfits (and
Candice) (@roofusandkilo), INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/roofusandkilo/ (last visited
Oct. 27, 2019); Noelani (@noelaniig), INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/noelaniig/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2019). For other fun or silly animal Instagram accounts, see Hamlet the Piggy (@hamlet_the_piggy), INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/hamlet_the_piggy/ (last visited Oct. 27,
2019); Jill the Squirrel (@this_girl_is_a_squirrel), INSTAGRAM, https://instagram.com/this_girl_
is_a_squirrel/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2019); Juniper the Fox (@juniperfoxx), INSTAGRAM, https://
www.instagram.com/juniperfoxx/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2019); Leo (@leothegoldendoodle_),
INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/leothegoldendoodle_/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2019); Lionel the
Hedgehog (@LionelTheHog), INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/lionelthehog/ (last visited
Oct. 27, 2019); and Milo Minderbinder (@milotheminderbinder), INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/milotheminderbinder/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2019).
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Although the American population’s perspective regarding animals has
changed, federal law has remained relatively stagnant.41 As of 2014, all fifty
states have passed felony animal cruelty statutes for serious violations.42
However, every state continues to classify animals as mere property, similar
to a table or a chair.43 Until 2019, federal law prohibited recording acts of
severe animal cruelty on video, but did not prohibit the acts themselves.44 Animal advocates, in one way or another,45 are leading the movement to reclassify animals or enact greater protections for America’s beloved companions.46

41. Chokshi, supra note 8. According to a 2015 Gallup poll, 32% of Americans believe that animals should be given the same rights as people. Rebecca Riffkin, In U.S., More Say Animals Should
Have Same Rights as People, GALLUP (May 18, 2015), https://news.gallup.com/poll/183275/say-animals-rights-people.aspx. This is an increase from the 25% of Americans who responded this way in
2008. Id.
42. See Chris Berry, All 50 States Now Have Felony Animal Cruelty Provisions, ANIMAL LEGAL
DEF. FUND. (Mar. 14, 2014), https://www.all-creatures.org/articles/ar-all-50-states-cruelty.html.
43. Wise, The Legal Thinghood, supra note 27, at 538 n.442.
44. Animal Crush Video Prohibition Act of 2010, 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2018). In January 2019, Florida
representative Ted Deutch introduced the Preventing Animal Cruelty and Torture Act to impose a
federal ban on animal crushing; the Act became law on November 25, 2019. See infra Section IV.A;
see also Chokshi, supra note 8.
45. Although most advocates fight for animals for the sake of the animals, the movement has
grown to incorporate a fight to protect humans. See Olivia S. Garber, Animal Abuse and Domestic
Violence: Why the Connection Justifies Increased Protection, 47 U. MEM. L. REV. 359, 361–62 (2016).
Many recent studies suggest that organized animal cruelty is generally a precursor or connected to
other crimes, such as corruption, domestic violence, and child abuse. See Animal Cruelty Facts and
Stats, HUMANE SOC’Y U.S., https://www.humanesociety.org/resources/animal-cruelty-facts-and-stats
(last visited Oct. 27, 2019). One survey reports that 71% of domestic abusers target pets as well. Id.
Another study reported a finding of pet abuse in 88% of homes under supervision for child abuse. Id.
In 2016, the FBI began tracking animal cruelty crimes—along with everything else in their expansive
criminal database—because animal cruelty is probably a precursor to more significant crimes. Tracking Animal Cruelty, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/-tracking-animal-cruelty. According to John Thompson, deputy executive director of the National
Sheriff’s Association, “[i]f somebody is harming an animal, there is a good chance they also are hurting a human.” Id. A National Sheriff’s Association report included the following statistics: (a) animal
abusers are five times more likely to commit violent crimes against people, (b) animal abusers are four
times more likely to commit property crimes, and (c) animal abusers are three times more likely to
have drug or disorderly conduct offenses. Deputy and Court Officer, NAT’L SHERIFF’S ASS’N 1, 26
(2014) (citing Arnold Arluke, Jack Levin, Carter Luke & Frank Ascione, The Relationship of Animal
Abuse to Violence and Other Forms of Antisocial Behavior, 14:9 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 963,
963–975 (1999)). Therefore, protecting animals with more effective animal cruelty statutes that apply
throughout the United States could ultimately protect potential human victims as well. See, e.g.,
Charles Siebert, The Animal-Cruelty Syndrome, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 11, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/13/magazine/13dogfighting-t.html.
46. See infra Part III.

829

[Vol. 47: 821, 2020]

Federal Protections for “Fur-Babies”
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

III. ANIMAL ADVOCATES DIVIDED
Animal advocates generally derive from one of two denominations—animal rights theorists or animal welfare advocates.47 Although both types of
animal defenders believe in reforming the legal structure concerning animals,
the two parties disagree about fundamental aspects of how reform should
manifest.48 Animal rights theorists argue that it is necessary to reclassify animals and grant animals “legal personhood”49 to protect their interests.50 Welfare theorists continue to believe in the “paternalistic solution of regulating
[human] use of animals” and balancing human interests against appropriate
animal treatment.51
A. Animal Rights v. Animal Welfare
Animal rights theory demands that animals be respected as valuable in
and of themselves, rather than as a means to an end.52 These scholars argue
that an animal welfare system—which requires balancing human interests
against animal treatment—can almost never weigh in favor of the animal due
to the animal’s status as human property.53 Because American legal systems
traditionally aim to maximize and protect an individual’s property rights, a
human’s property interest will almost always prevail over the interests of the
property itself, which has no rights.54 Thus, recognizing that animals have
rights, as animal rights theorists propose, is merely an instrument to protect
animal interests.55
47. Daniel Davison-Vecchione & Kate Pambos, Steven M. Wise and the Common Law Case for
Animal Rights: Full Steam Ahead, 30 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 287, 290 (2017).
48. Id.
49. Legal personhood refers to the concept of animals being granted certain fundamental legal
rights such as bodily integrity or the right to be free from slavery. See infra notes 79–91 and accompanying text.
50. Davison-Vecchione & Pambos, supra note 47, at 290.
51. Id.
52. GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 7 (1995) [hereinafter FRANCIONE,
ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW].
53. Id. at 4, 93 (analogizing animals to humans: “If one human is a resource of another, then that
other human gets to value the interests of the resource in not suffering, and this valuation may be based
solely on what will benefit the valuer and with absolutely no regard for what will benefit the valued.”).
54. Id. at 4–5.
55. FRANCIONE, INTRO TO ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 33, at 93 (“To say that my interest is protected by a right is to say that it is protected against being abrogated merely because such abrogation
produces beneficial consequences for someone else.”).
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Animal rights theorists generally analogize the use of animals with human
slavery.56 Simplified for the analogy, animal rights theorists propose the following premises: (1) every human has the most basic right to not be enslaved,
because every human has an interest in avoiding suffering from being used as
a means to another’s end—i.e. used as human property;57 and (2) all animals
also have an interest in avoiding pain and suffering from being used as a
means to another’s end—i.e. used as human property—and therefore, every
animal should also have the most basic right to not be enslaved.58
Animal rights theorists apply the philosophical principle of equal consideration, which requires treating similar interests similarly, unless there is a
morally sound reason for divergence.59 At the most basic level—where humans and animals are similarly sentient beings with similar interests in avoiding pain and suffering—the difference in species is not a sufficient morally
sound reason to recognize the fundamental rights of one, but not the other.60
Therefore, according to animal rights theorists and the principle of equal consideration, if American society recognizes human fundamental rights, it
should equally recognize animal fundamental rights.61 However, most animal
rights theorists agree that respecting an animal’s right to not be property does
not mean that animals must be treated the same as humans for all purposes,
or, for instance, that animals should be granted the right to vote or to attend
school.62 Animal rights theorists argue that treating an animal as a legal person does not mean that the animal is equivalent to a human, rather that the

56. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW, supra note 52, at 110–12 (“There were laws
that protected slaves and that ostensibly gave ‘rights’ to those persons, but the laws were seldom, if
ever, enforced or at all meaningful to the slave. Although slaves were obviously people, the law
treated them as ‘chattels,’ or as the personal property of their owners, rather than as persons.”).
57. FRANCIONE, INTRO TO ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 33, at 89, 92 (“The laws of almost every
nation in the world prohibit chattel slavery, and the international community condemns slavery as a
violation of basic human rights. . . . [W]e must, at the very least, recognize that all sentient humans
have an interest in not suffering at all as the result of their use as the resource[] of others.”).
58. Id. at xxviii, 81.
59. Id. at 82–84, 86–90. The principle of equal consideration is found throughout moral theories
and requires that moral judgments be universal, rather than based upon self-interest or the interests of
a special group. Id. at 82–83. However, the principle does not require treating every creature the same
for all purposes. Id.
60. Id. at 99–100.
61. FRANCIONE, INTRO TO ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 33, at 100–02.
62. Id. at xxxi, 101 (“No one argues that we should extend to animals the right to vote or to drive
a car or to own property or to attend a university, or many other rights that we reserve to competent
human beings.”).
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animal has morally significant interests and should not be treated as merely a
resource.63
Animal welfare advocates, on the other hand, assert that animals should
be protected against cruelty and maltreatment,64 but that such protections
should be based on weighing human interests (in using animals) against animal interests (in avoiding suffering).65 According to the World Organisation
for Animal Health (OIE),66 “[g]ood animal welfare requires disease prevention and appropriate veterinary care, shelter, management and nutrition, a
stimulating and safe environment, humane handling and humane slaughter or
killing.”67 This agenda prohibits unnecessary suffering, but allows humans to
use animals as resources so long as the animals are treated humanely.68 In the
United States, the Animal Welfare Act69—which sets minimum standards of
animal treatment in research, commercial use, and entertainment—is a prime
example of the responsibility granted to humans to ensure proper treatment of
animals, even when they are classified as property.70
Animal welfare advocates are further divided into two subgroups: those
who believe that expanding regulation is a necessary step toward eventually
ending animal exploitation, and those who believe that animals do not have
rights.71 Animal rights theorists argue that progress within the realm of animal
welfare cannot lead to real animal protection, because equal consideration of
interests is impossible to achieve when animals are classified as property.72

63. Id. at 100.
64. Ralph A. DeMeo, Defining Animal Rights and Animal Welfare: A Lawyer’s Guide, 91 FLA.
B.J. 42, 42 (2017).
65. FRANCIONE, INTRO TO ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 33, at 85.
66. On January 25, 1924, twenty-eight countries signed an international agreement to create the
OIE, an intergovernmental organization. What is the OIE?, WORLD ORGANISATION FOR ANIMAL
HEALTH, http://www.oie.int/about-us/director-general-office/what-is-the-oie/ (last visited Oct. 27,
2019). The OIE currently consists of 182 members, including the United States. The 182 OIE Members, WORLD ORGANISATION FOR ANIMAL HEALTH, http://www.oie.int/about-us/our-members/member-countries/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2019).
67. Terrestrial Animal Health Code, ch. 7.1, art. 7.1.1 (2019), http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/
eng/Health_standards/tahc/current/chapitre_aw_introduction.pdf.
68. DeMeo, supra note 64, at 44.
69. Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131–2159 (2012).
70. DeMeo, supra note 64, at 44.
71. Davison-Vecchione & Pambos, supra note 47, at 290.
72. Robert Garner, Animal Welfare: A Political Defense, 1 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 161, 168
(2006); see also FRANCIONE, INTRO TO ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 33, at xxxi (“There is . . . no empirical evidence that the regulation of animal exploitation leads to the abolition of exploitation.”).
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Although animal welfare advocates in both subgroups73 recognize the philosophical flaws in the argument for animal welfare (rather than animal rights),
they view the fight for animal welfare as the more realistic battle at the moment.74 While it may be true that an animal’s property status is incompatible
with a theory of animal rights, this incompatibility does not prevent animal
welfare advocates from enacting basic protections for animals now.75 According to animal welfare advocates, it is imperative to remember that the law is
generally a reflection of society, and a law-maker cannot stretch a policy much
further than public opinion allows.76 Therefore, an animal welfare argument
recognizes the need to negotiate with the government and encourage the legislature to provide immediate protection for animals through compromises.77
In addition to compromising for meaningful protections right now, animal
welfare advocates campaign to expand the definition of unnecessary suffering, while strengthening the societal shift in perception needed to enact future,
more expansive animal protections.78
B. Legal Personhood v. Legal Standing
Animal rights theorists generally advocate for reclassifying animals as
legal persons—or perhaps into a separate category of a “living property”—in
order to recognize that animals have inalienable rights and potentially bear
duties within society.79 Animal welfare advocates are generally more willing
to negotiate and compromise by accepting an animal welfare law that includes
73. The advocates who believe in taking smaller, more manageable steps toward animal rights rely
heavily on the philosophical arguments within the animal rights movement, because their goal ultimately aligns with the animal rights theorists. See, e.g., Davison-Vecchione & Pambos, supra note
47, at 290. Advocates who do not believe that animals have rights still subscribe to the notion that
animals should not be subjected to unnecessary suffering. Id. However, they do not believe that
animal welfare laws should be used as steps in a larger movement toward granting animals rights. Id.
at 289–90. For those advocates, enacting the animal welfare laws to prevent unnecessary suffering is
the ultimate goal. Id.
74. Garner, supra note 72, at 173–74 (“To others, including this author, it represents a realistic
appraisal of what can be achieved now and in the short term, given the present vulnerable and arrogant
state of the human condition.”).
75. Id. at 168.
76. Id. at 172.
77. Id. (providing an English example: “[T]he 1986 Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act offered
better protection for animals than it might have otherwise done because a group of animal advocates . . . were prepared to negotiate with government.”).
78. Id. at 169–70.
79. See Animal Advocacy and Causes of Action, supra note 6, at 95.

833

[Vol. 47: 821, 2020]

Federal Protections for “Fur-Babies”
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

legal standing for animals in narrowly defined situations, which can protect
animals now while society’s perception continues to evolve.80
1. Current State of the Law: Legal Personhood
Black’s Law Dictionary defines a legal person as “[a]n entity, such as a
corporation, created by law and given certain legal rights and duties of a human being; a being, real or imaginary, who for the purpose of legal reasoning
is treated more or less as a human being.”81 The concept of legal personhood
can be divided into two categories: natural persons and artificial persons.82 A
natural person refers only to human beings, who obtain legal rights upon
birth83 and are entitled to maximum legal protections.84 An artificial person85
adheres to the dictionary definition, and refers to an entity that is granted some
legal rights and protections similar to natural persons.86 Prominent examples
of artificial persons are corporations and government organizations, however
this category includes many other entities.87

80. See Garner, supra note 72, at 163.
81. Legal Person, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Neither the Constitution nor the
Supreme Court provides a definition of “person.” See Jessica Berg, Of Elephants and Embryos: A
Proposed Framework for Legal Personhood, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 369, 371 (2007).
82. Alexis Dyschkant, Legal Personhood: How We Are Getting It Wrong, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV.
2075, 2079 (2015) (“The U.S. Constitution draws a principled distinction between natural persons and
other legal persons, securing some rights for natural persons alone.”).
83. In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment protection of “persons” extends to a viable or nonviable fetus. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). However, the Court
did not preclude states from classifying a fetus as a “person” so long as it was outside of the context
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections. See Jeffrey A. Parness, Social Commentary: Values and
Legal Personhood, 83 W. VA. L. REV. 487, 491 (1981). The Court also recognizes that when states
do enact protections for pre-birth forms of human life, it is generally contingent upon live birth. Id. at
493 (“[T]hat is, live birth triggers the retroactive vesting of rights upon the unborn.”). Therefore,
similar to animal welfare laws, which provide protection without granting legal rights for animals,
state statutes generally protect pre-life forms, but do not grant them legal rights equivalent to a natural
person. Id.
84. Berg, supra note 81, at 373.
85. Also known as juridical or fictitious persons. See id.
86. Id. There are legal rights that are exclusive to natural persons. See Dyschkant, supra note 82,
at 2079 (“The Privileges and Immunities clause is limited to natural persons because they have ‘a more
robust set of rights than all persons generally.’” (quoting Richard A. Epstein, Of Citizens and Persons:
Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 334, 341 (2005))).
87. See, e.g., 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2018) (defining “person” to include “corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals”); Lawrence B.
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Generally, a legal person is characterized as a bearer of both rights and
duties,88 but the particular bundle of rights and duties that applies will vary
depending on whether the person is natural or artificial and other factors
within each category.89 Because of that variation, the concept of legal personhood is more of a spectrum than a bright line characterization.90 In a theoretical hierarchy, natural persons would have precedence over artificial legal persons.91
Animals rights theorists propose a plethora of arguments focused on this
spectrum theory of legal personhood to find a place on the spectrum for animals.92 For example, one argument challenges the fact that a human who can
bear neither rights nor duties, such as an infant or permanently comatose individual, is on the legal person spectrum, while an animal continues to be precluded from the characterization.93 Another argument contends that a legal
person need not bear rights and duties, but instead the definition should require merely a bearer of rights or duties.94
Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1231, 1239 (1992) (“In admiralty, a ship itself becomes the subject of a proceeding in rem and can be found ‘guilty.’”).
88. Dyschkant, supra note 82, at 2076 (“[T]he key element of legal personhood seems to be the
ability to bear rights and duties.”); see also JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE
LAW 27 (1909) (“[T]he technical legal meaning of a ‘person’ is a subject of legal rights and duties.”).
89. See Solum, supra note 87, at 1239. A legal person usually has the capacity to own property,
be a party to a contract, or to sue and be sued. Id.
90. Carter Dillard, Empathy with Animals: A Litmus Test for Legal Personhood?, 19 ANIMAL L.
1, 4 (2012) (“[L]egal personhood is a matter of degree depending on which rights and duties one has—
one can be more or less a legal person according to whether one is a prisoner, minor, parolee, probationer, future person, intending immigrant, corporation, animal, etcetera . . . .”); see also Dyschkant,
supra note 82, at 2081 (“The law recognizes that children cannot be held as legally responsible as
adults, and thus limits their rights and duties.”).
91. Berg, supra note 81, at 374 (“Our society was developed by and for natural persons, and thus
legal rights focus on this group.”).
92. Dyschkant, supra note 82, at 2108 (“We may benefit from remembering that being capable of
having rights and duties is not always a zero sum game, and sometimes more like a spectrum . . . . It
seems plausible that animals could also exist on this spectrum . . . .”).
93. See, e.g., Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Litigating Nonhuman Animal Legal Personhood, 50 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 573, 578 (2018) [hereinafter Cupp, Litigating Legal Personhood]. Cupp refers to this as an
“argument from marginal cases” and strongly opposes any argument that will compare a “marginal”
human to an “intelligent” animal because of the negative consequences that could materialize from
such a comparison. Id. But Alexis Dyschkant notes that this argument is relevant because it is evidence of our illogical impulse to equate legal personhood with humanity. Dyschkant, supra note 82,
at 2080 (“[T]he tendency to equate legal personhood with humanity is so strong that it can lead lawmakers to declare humans to be persons that are incapable of exercising rights or owing duties and
refuse to declare nonhumans to be persons that are capable of exercising rights and owing duties.”).
94. Steven Tudor, Some Implications for Legal Personhood of Extending Legal Rights to Non-
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According to a leading animal rights advocate, Steven Wise, “[o]nly legal
persons count in courtrooms, or can be legally seen, for only they exist in law
for their own benefits.”95 In contrast, Wise explains a legal thing can “exist
in law solely for the sakes of legal persons.”96 Wise created an “Animal
Rights Pyramid” to demonstrate the importance of obtaining legal personhood
for animals.97 The base of the pyramid (level one) emphasizes the foundational quality of the concept of legal personhood, which merely recognizes an
animal’s capacity to possess any legal right.98 Level two then consists of the
actual “legal rights possessed” by the animal, which may or may not include
the right to sue or have its rights represented by a third party.99 If the animal
has the capacity to possess a legal right (recognized in level one when an animal is granted legal personhood), and actually possesses a legal right and a
system of asserting that right, the third level asks if the animal “possess[es] a
private right of action bestowed by statute, constitution, treaty, or common
law.”100 According to Wise, an animal can only have standing in a judicial
proceeding after the requirements of levels one through three are satisfied.101
Because Wise believes that standing cannot be obtained without achieving
legal person status, his foundation, the Nonhuman Rights Project, focuses on
reclassifying animals as legal persons.102
The Nonhuman Rights Project has filed a series of cases attempting to
expand the definition of legal personhood to include animals, even if it means
placing animals lower on the hierarchy than natural or artificial persons.103

Human Animals, 35 AUSTL. J. LEGAL PHIL. 134, 137 (2010) (advocating for a status of “quasi” legal
person for a creature that bears only rights without duties).
95. Steven M. Wise, Legal Personhood and the Nonhuman Rights Project, 17 ANIMAL L. 1, 1
(2010) [hereinafter Wise, Legal Personhood].
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2 fig.1.
98. Id. at 2 fig.1, 5.
99. Id. at 2 fig.1. An animal may possess a legal right “with regards to bodily integrity or bodily
liberty” even if the animal does not have the cognitive ability to understand or pursue a legal claim.
Id. at 3.
100. Id. For example, the Animal Welfare Act does not include any private right of action for
violations, however the Endangered Species Act creates a private right of action for “any person [to]
commence a civil suit on his own behalf” for violations of the Act. See Animal Welfare Act, 7
U.S.C. §§ 2131–2159 (2018); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1) (2018).
101. Wise, Legal Personhood, supra note 95, at 4.
102. Id. at 8–9.
103. See Litigation: Confronting the Core Issue of Nonhuman Animals’ Legal Thinghood,
NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, https://www.nonhumanrights.org/litigation/ (last visited Oct. 27,
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Many of these cases involve an animal, owned by a private party, confined in
detrimental or harmful conditions.104 The Nonhuman Rights Project regularly
attempts to file habeas corpus writs on behalf of confined animals, but courts
consistently reject these claims and decline to consider animals legal persons.105 Other organizations have abandoned Wise’s pyramid and instead advocate for legal standing in lower courts to remedy an animal’s harm, garnering mixed results.106

2019). For examples of cases in which the Nonhuman Rights Project seeks a writ of habeas corpus
on behalf of animals held in inappropriate conditions by private owners, see Nonhuman Rights Project,
Inc. ex rel. Beulah v. R.W. Commerford & Sons, Inc., No. LLICV175009822S, 2017 WL 7053738
(Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 26, 2017); Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex. rel. Tommy v. Lavery (Lavery
II), 54 N.Y.S.3d 392 (App. Div. 2017); Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Kiko v. Presti, 999
N.Y.S.2d 652 (App. Div. 2015); People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery (Lavery I),
998 N.Y.S.2d 248 (App. Div. 2014). In Lavery II, the Nonhuman Rights Project argued that “if humans bereft of autonomy, self-determination, sentience, consciousness, even a brain, are entitled to
personhood and legal rights, then this Court must either recognize [the animal’s] just equality claim
to bodily liberty or reject equality entirely.” Petitioners’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Order to
Show Cause & Writ of Habeas Corpus and Order Granting the Immediate Release of Tommy at 73,
Lavery II, 54 N.Y.S.3d 392 (No. 3648); see also Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 49, Lavery II, 54
N.Y.S.3d 392 (No. 3648).
104. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 103. For example, Lavery I and Lavery II involve a chimpanzee, Tommy, who is held alone in a cage, in a shed, on a used trailer lot along a highway in New York.
Lavery II, 54 N.Y.S.3d at 394; Lavery I, 998 N.Y.S.2d at 248. Beulah revolves around three elephants
who are routinely paraded around in a circus/fair by owners who have been cited for Animal Welfare
Act violations (for failing to adhere to minimum standards of care) more than fifty times. Beulah,
2017 WL 7053738, at *1. Presti is a case about Kiko, a chimpanzee held in a cage in a cement
storefront in a residential area of Niagara Falls, New York. 999 N.Y.S.2d at 652.
105. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 103. In both Lavery I and Lavery II, the court based its decision
on the theories of reciprocity and community membership. Lavery II, 54 N.Y.S.3d 392; Lavery I, 998
N.Y.S.2d 248. The theory of reciprocity requires an individual to have the ability to both enjoy rights
and possess legal duties in order to be characterized as a legal person. Lavery I, 998 N.Y.S.2d at 250.
The requirement of community membership states that the enjoyment of rights arises from membership in a political society. See Lavery II, 54 N.Y.S.3d at 395–96; Lavery I, 998 N.Y.S.2d at 251;
Davison-Vecchione & Pambos, supra note 47, at 297–98. However, the Lavery I court noted that
although they would not accept an animal rights argument, the animals were not left defenseless because animal cruelty statutes prevent animals from being mistreated. Lavery I, 998 N.Y.S.2d at 251.
106. See, e.g., Marbeled Murrelet v. Pac. Lumber Co., 880 F. Supp. 1343, 1346 (N.D. Cal. 1995)
(allowing standing for a bird), aff’d sub nom. Marbeled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir.
1996); Loggerhead Turtle v. Cty. Council, 896 F. Supp. 1170, 1177 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (allowing standing for a turtle); Citizens to End Animal Suffering & Exploitation, Inc. v. New England Aquarium,
836 F. Supp. 45, 49 (D. Mass. 1993) (denying standing for a dolphin); Hawaiian Crow (‘Alala) v.
Lujan, 906 F. Supp. 549, 551–52 (D. Haw. 1991) (denying standing to a bird).
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2. Current State of the Law: Legal Standing
The standing doctrine is rooted in Article III of the United States Constitution107 and is used to promote separation of powers by granting courts the
power to hear only “cases” and “controversies” rather than general social
problems.108 Although the standing requirement is derived from the Constitution, the doctrine “embraces several judicially self-imposed limits on the
exercise of federal jurisdiction.”109 One such prudential requirement applicable here is the Supreme Court’s “zone of interest” test, which restricts standing
to only those interests that are “arguably within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.”110
In the 1990s, the Supreme Court decided two important standing cases
that reflected a narrower approach to the standing doctrine and, in turn, greatly
limited animals’ legal protections.111 Both cases involved the Endangered
Species Act (ESA), which is an animal welfare act that provides protection
from human activity for members of endangered or threatened species and
their habitats.112 In accordance with animal welfare advocates’ paternalistic
approach,113 the Act encourages citizen participation to compel enforcement
107. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2.
108. See Kurt S. Kusiak, Standing to Sue: A Brief Review of Current Standing Doctrine, 71 B.U. L.
REV. 667, 668 (1991); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 882 (1983).
109. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
110. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163 (1997) (citing Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Org. v.
Camp, 387 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)). Other self-imposed limits include “the general prohibition on a
litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights [and] the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches.” Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
111. Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Bennett, 520 U.S. at 154. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court in both Lujan and Bennett. Lujan, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Bennett, 520
U.S. at 154. Prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court, then-Judge Scalia expressed distaste for
the Court’s expansive approach to standing, especially in environmental cases. Scalia, supra note 108,
at 886–90. Specifically, Judge Scalia argued that a beneficiary (an individual whose interests are
furthered by the statute) of a statute’s protections must qualify for standing, under a stricter injury-infact test rather than the test imposed upon the object (an individual who is regulated by the statute) of
a statute’s regulations. Id. at 895–96; see also Katherine A. Burke, Can We Stand for It? Amending
the Endangered Species Act with an Animal-Suit Provision, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 633, 645–46 (2004)
(discussing Justice Scalia’s approach in more detail). Justice Scalia used Lujan as an opportunity to
invoke the new stricter injury-in-fact test, and then upheld it in Bennett. See infra notes 116–29 and
accompanying text.
112. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2018); Burke, supra note 111, at 640.
113. See supra Section III.A.
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through the following citizen-suit provision:
[A]ny person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf—(A) to
enjoin any person, including the United States . . . who is alleged to
be in violation of any provision . . . or (B) to compel the Secretary to
apply . . . the prohibitions . . . of this title with respect to the taking of
any resident endangered species or threatened species . . . or (C)
against the Secretary where there is alleged a failure of the Secretary
to perform any act or duty.114
However, as the following Supreme Court decisions demonstrate, the ESA’s
citizen-suit provision was not formed adequately enough to achieve its desired
goal.115
First, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, respondents attempted to invoke
the citizen-suit provision to compel application of the ESA to federallyfunded projects abroad that may have threatened protected species.116 Justice
Scalia, writing for the Court,117 introduced a new, stricter injury-in-fact test
for statutory beneficiaries118—as opposed to statutory objects, who must
merely satisfy the previous “zone of interests” test.119 The Court held that an
injury-in-fact must be:

114. Burke, supra note 111, at 641 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 540(g)(1) (2018)). Despite the holdings
discussed in the following paragraphs, the Supreme Court itself acknowledged that the ESA “encouraged” citizen involvement in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180–81 (1978). Id.
115. Burke, supra note 111, at 638.
116. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 558–59.
117. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III-A, and IV, in
which Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas joined, and an opinion with respect to Part III-B, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Thomas joined.
Id. at 557. Justice Kennedy wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment and
was joined by Justice Souter. Id. at 579. Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 581. Justice
Blackmun was joined by Justice O’Connor in a dissenting opinion. Id. at 589.
118. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562 (“Thus, when the plaintiff is not himself the object of the government action or inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily ‘substantially more
difficult’ to establish.”); Burke, supra note 111, at 646.
119. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. In announcing the stricter injury-in-fact test, Justice Scalia also rejected three other creative theories of injury: (1) “‘animal nexus’ approach whereby anyone who has
an interest in studying or seeing the endangered animals anywhere on the globe has standing”; (2)
“ecosystem nexus,” which “propose[d] that any person who uses any part of a ‘contiguous ecosystem’
adversely affected [on the globe] . . . has standing”; and (3) “‘vocational nexus’ approach, under which
anyone with a professional interest in such animals can sue.” Id. at 565–66.
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(a) concrete and particularized and (b) “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”[;] . . . there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be
“fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and
not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not
before the court”[;] . . . [and] it must be “likely,” as opposed to
merely “speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable
decision.”120
The Court also rejected an argument of “procedural injury” specifically regarding the citizen-suit provision of the ESA because “a generally available
grievance about government” is not sufficient to state an Article III case or
controversy.121 Therefore, the citizen-suit provision was insufficient to overcome the concrete injury required of statutory beneficiaries.122
Justice Scalia solidified this distinction between statutory beneficiaries
and statutory objects in Bennett v. Spear when the Court recognized the plaintiffs’ standing with minimal requirements.123 In Bennett, the plaintiffs filed
complaints after the Fish and Wildlife Service, in accordance with the ESA,
implemented measures to protect two species of endangered fish and their
habitats.124 Plaintiffs claimed that the protections, if implemented, would “irreparably damage[]” their use of the waterways in question for irrigation and
aesthetics.125 The lower courts aptly applied the “zone of interests” test and
held that plaintiffs did not have standing because their “recreational, aesthetic,
and commercial interests . . . [did] not fall within the zone of interests sought

120. Id. at 560–61 (alteration in original).
121. Id. at 573–75.
122. Id. at 574–75.
123. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 164 (1997). Here, the Court merely required that the plaintiffs
satisfy the “zone of interests” test, rather than the injury-in-fact test applied in Lujan. Id.; see also
Burke, supra note 111, at 646–47 (“When ‘the plaintiff is complaining of an agency’s unlawful failure
to impose a requirement or prohibition upon someone else,’ that plaintiff asserts ‘majoritarian’ concerns, which belong in the political sphere. In order to overcome that presumption against standing
and obtain judicial redress, a statutory beneficiary must meet a very stringent injury-in-fact
test . . . . In marked contrast to judicial skepticism about the standing of statutory beneficiaries,
‘[w]hen an individual who is the very object of a law’s requirement or prohibition seeks to challenge
it,’ this party should always have standing to sue.” (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting
Scalia, supra note 108, at 894)).
124. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 158–59.
125. Id. at 160.
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to be protected by the ESA.”126 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
Congress expressly negated127 the “zone of interests” test by including the citizen-suit provision in the ESA.128 Therefore, the Court determined that the
“zone of interests” test did not apply to the plaintiffs’ case, and the plaintiffs’
alleged injury was sufficient to grant standing.129
The effect of Justice Scalia’s contrasting opinions—and the current state
of Congress’s attempt to protect animals—is confounding.130 The Lujan and
Bennett decisions make it increasingly difficult for Congress to confer standing upon the groups it seeks to protect.131 After Bennett, a plaintiff may invoke
the ESA’s citizen-suit provision to inhibit animal protections and advance human interests, but according to Lujan a plaintiff may not invoke the same provision to encourage animal protections.132
Fortunately, the Court’s holdings in Lujan and Bennett are not required
by the Constitution, but rather by the Court’s own prudence.133 Contrary to a
constitutional requirement, the Court’s self-imposed prudential requirements
may “be modified or abrogated by Congress.”134 Congress has the ability to
grant a private right of action to a group of individuals to circumvent the
Court’s prudential standing requirements.135 Congress has generally used this
power to explicitly grant private rights of action to injured individuals who
need protection and lack other remedies.136 For example, the Americans with
Disabilities Act grants disabled individuals the right to bring their own causes
of action against employers, government entities, and public accommodations
who violate the statute.137 The Court has also honored implied private rights
126. Id. at 160–61 (citing Bennett v. Plenart, 63 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 1995)).
127. Contrary to Lujan, in Bennett the citizen-suit provision was sufficient to negate the Court’s
other self-imposed, prudential requirements. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 163.
128. Id. at 164.
129. Id.
130. Burke, supra note 111, at 648–49.
131. Id. at 642.
132. Id. at 646–48.
133. See, e.g., Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason Ellis, The Standing Doctrine’s Dirty Little Secret,
107 NW. U. L. REV. 169, 170–74 (2012).
134. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162; see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500–01 (1975) (“In some
circumstances, countervailing considerations may outweigh the concerns underlying the usual reluctance to exert judicial power . . . .”).
135. Burke, supra note 111, at 650.
136. See, e.g., Susan J. Stabile, Role of Congressional Intent in Determining the Existence of Implied Private Rights of Action, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 861 (1996).
137. See Private Suits, 28 C.F.R. § 36.501 (2018).
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of action in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934138 and Titles VI and IX of
the Civil Rights Act.139 For a private right of action to be upheld, Congress
must clearly and narrowly define both the potential plaintiff and the injury to
be protected against.140 Congress must also “adequately link the defined injuries to the defined class of plaintiffs now empowered to sue.”141
Although Congress’s attempt at a citizen-suit provision in the ESA was
ultimately unsuccessful, lawmakers retain the ability to try again.142 To execute a proper citizen-suit provision, Congress should tailor any further animal
protection legislation to comply with the Court’s clearly demonstrated requirements.143
IV. A SAMPLING OF STATUTES
Animal cruelty is a criminal offense in every state, but definitions and
punishments vary across states and statutes.144 States often do not have ade-

138. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432–35 (1964) (finding a private right of action exists
under Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, despite other remedies available to plaintiff); Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Private Investor Has Private Right of Action Under Section
14(a), 1962 DUKE L.J. 151 (1962).
139. See Rebecca D. Graves, An Implied Private Right of Action Under Title VI, 37 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 297 (1980). Although the Supreme Court has not expressly decided whether a private right
of action is implied under Title VI, the Court has allowed two separate, private plaintiffs to recover
directly under the statute. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Lau v. Nichols,
414 U.S. 563 (1974). The Court did expressly hold in Cannon v. University of Chicago that a private
right of action exists under Title IX. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). The Court’s holding in Cannon “was based
on the legislative history indicating that Congress intended Title IX to be enforced like Title VI, and
that Congress believed Title VI to encompass a private right of action.” Graves, supra note 139, at
304.
140. Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992).
141. Burke, supra note 111, at 657 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580).
142. Id. at 651; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Standing for Animals (with Notes on Animal Rights), 47
UCLA L. REV. 1333, 1361 (2000) (noting that nothing in the Constitution prevents Congress from
granting standing to animals).
143. See infra Part V; see also Burke, supra note 111, at 658–60 (analyzing Congressional power
to enact an animal-suit provision within the Endangered Species Act according to the Supreme Court’s
standing requirements).
144. See, e.g., 2018 U.S. Animal Protection Laws State Rankings, ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND,
https://aldf.org/project/2018-us-state-rankings/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2019). Despite the differences,
state laws generally protect domestic or companion animals and some states protect wildlife. Laws
That Protect Animals, ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND, https://aldf.org/article/laws-that-protect-animals/
(last visited Nov. 1, 2019). State protections regularly exclude farmed and laboratory animals. Id.
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quate resources to expend on animals, and many states do not prioritize enforcement of animal cruelty protections.145 This Part introduces the newlyenacted federal animal cruelty statute as a building block and samples three
states’ provisions—Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Oregon—for inspiration
for an even more comprehensive federal solution to animal cruelty.146
A. The Preventing Animal Cruelty and Torture Act
In November 2019, Congress enacted the Preventing Animal Cruelty and
Torture Act (PACT) to prohibit animal crushing as well as the creation or
distribution of animal crush videos.147 As defined in PACT, animal crushing
refers to “conduct in which one or more living non-human mammals, birds,
reptiles, or amphibians is purposefully crushed, burned, drowned, suffocated,
impaled, or otherwise subjected to serious bodily injury.”148 Serious bodily
injury includes “bodily injury which involves (a) a substantial risk of death,
(b) extreme physical pain, (c) protracted and obvious disfigurement, or (d)
protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or
mental faculty.”149 PACT is rooted in the commerce clause of the Constitution, which means the law only applies to animal crushing that is related to
interstate commerce or takes place on federal land.150 For example, a dog
145. See Animal Advocacy and Causes of Action, supra note 6; see also Katie Galanes, The Contradiction: Animal Abuse—Alive and Well, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 209, 221 (2010) (“The most significant issue in dealing with animal cruelty, animal abuse, and dogfighting cases is an overall lack of
enforcement.”).
146. See infra Part V, which analyzes the pertinent provisions and combines those provisions into
a federal Proposed Animal Protection Bill.
147. Preventing Animal Cruelty and Torture Act, Pub. L. No. 116-72, 133 Stat. 1151 (2019) (to be
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 48). Representative Theodore E. Deutch introduced the bill to the House of
Representatives on January 23, 2019 to replace the previous animal crushing statute that was deemed
unconstitutional in United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010), on the grounds that it was too broad
and could have prohibited activities protected by the First Amendment. See Animal Crush Video
Prohibition Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-152, 113 Stat. 1732 (1999) (previously codified at 18
U.S.C. § 48). The PACT passed in the House of Representatives on October 22, 2019 and in the
Senate on November 5, 2019. H.R. Rep. No. 116–724 (2019). President Trump signed the PACT
into public law, effective immediately, on November 25, 2019. Id.
148. Preventing Animal Cruelty and Torture Act, Pub. L. No. 116-72, 133 Stat. 1151, 1152 (2019)
(to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 48(f)(1)).
149. 18 U.S.C. § 1365(h)(3).
150. Preventing Animal Cruelty and Torture Act, Pub. L. No. 116-72, 133 Stat. 1151, 1151 (2019)
(to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 48(a)(1)) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to purposefully engage in
animal crushing in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce . . . .” (emphasis added)). According
to the Commerce Clause, Congress has the enumerated power “to regulate commerce with foreign
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breeder who sells his puppies across state lines is engaged in interstate commerce and therefore would be prohibited by PACT from engaging in any animal crushing behavior.151
The PACT should be applauded as a genuine step forward for animal protections, but it may also be too narrowly tailored to make a significant difference.152 States are still left to manage the overwhelming workload of investigating and prosecuting animal cruelty cases that do not cross state lines and
even in cases where the PACT applies, the federal government may not prioritize animal welfare when resources are limited. 153 Of course, the actual effects of PACT are yet to be determined and the animal welfare community
remains optimistic that this new law can bring about much-needed assistance
from the federal government.154

nations, and among the several states.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
151. See Danny Prater, Animal Abuse Now a Federal Offense After Passage of PACT Act, PETA
(Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.peta.org/blog/pact-act-signed-into-law/.
152. Id.; see also Preventing Animal Cruelty and Torture (PACT) Act, ANIMAL WELFARE INST.,
https://awionline.org/content/preventing-animal-cruelty-and-torture-pact-act (last visited Dec. 31,
2019); Preventing Animal Cruelty and Torture (PACT) Act (Federal), ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND,
https://aldf.org/project/preventing-animal-cruelty-and-torture-pact-act/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2019);
Joshua Bote, House Unanimously Passes Bipartisan Bill to Make Animal Cruelty a Federal Crime,
USA TODAY (Oct. 24, 2019, 4:57 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/10/23/
house-passes-bipartisan-bill-make-animal-cruelty-federal-crime/4076657002/ (containing a statement
from the ASPCA in support of the PACT Act).
153. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; infra note 169.
154. See Gabrielle Wast, The PACT Act: A Step in the Right Direction on the Path to Animal Welfare, JURIST (Dec. 1, 2019, 8:55:43 PM), https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2019/12/courtney-leepact-act/.
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B. Connecticut’s Animal Advocate Provision
Connecticut animal protection statutes include liability for (a) intentionally killing or injuring a companion animal,155 (b) general cruelty to animals,156 (c) malicious and intentional injury or killing,157 and (d) special statutes for injury or killing of service or law enforcement animals.158 Various
animal fighting activities and sexual assault of an animal are also prohibited.159 Animal protection statutes generally exempt veterinary practice, research animals, wildlife, and accepted farm animal husbandry practices.160
In 2016, Connecticut enacted a statute (the Advocate Act) allowing a
court to appoint an advocate in proceedings regarding the welfare or custody
of a cat or dog.161 When the court deems it necessary or upon request of a
party, a court may appoint an advocate—from a list of advocates162 maintained

155. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22-351 (2019). A first offense is generally classified as a misdemeanor,
with a sentence of six months imprisonment and/or $1,000 fine. Id. A second offense is a class E
felony. Id.
156. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-247(a) (2019). A first offense is generally classified as a misdemeanor, with a sentence of up to one-year imprisonment and/or a fine of up to $1,000. Id. A second
offense is a class D felony. Id.
157. Id. § 53-247(b). A first offense is a class D felony and a second offense is a class C felony.
Id.
158. Id. § 53-247(d)–(e). Intentional injury of a service or law enforcement animal is a class D
felony. Id. § 53-247(d). Intentional killing of a law enforcement animal is a felony and carries a
sentence of up to ten years imprisonment and/or a fine of up to $10,000. Id. § 53-247(e).
159. Id. § 53-247(c) (prohibiting animal fighting activities); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-73a (2018)
(classifying sexual assault of an animal as a class A misdemeanor).
160. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-247(b) (2019).
161. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-86n (2019). Connecticut is the first to enact a law of this kind; however, officials in other states such as New Jersey, New York, and Maine have shown interest in enacting similar provisions. Michelle Tuccitto Sullo, Animal Advocates Help to Bring Justice for Abused
Cats and Dogs, NEW HAVEN REGISTER, https://www.nhregister.com/news/article/Animal-advocateshelp-to-bring-justice-for-abused-13565197.php (last updated Jan. 27, 2019, 1:23 PM). California and
a federal district court in Virginia have also used comparable provisions in the past. See CAL. PROB.
CODE §§ 1003, 15212 (2016). California allows appointment of a guardian ad litem to advocate for
the interests of an animal when that animal is the beneficiary of a trust. Id. § 1003(a). The United
States District Court in the Eastern District of Virginia also appointed a guardian, Rebecca J. Huss,
for the animal victims in the Michael Vick dogfighting case. See Nicole Pallotta, Unique Connecticut
Law Allows Court-Appointed Advocates to Represent Animals, ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND
https://aldf.org/article/unique-connecticut-law-allows-court-appointed-advocates-to-represent-animals/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2019); see, e.g., Rebecca J. Huss, Lessons Learned: Acting as Guardian/Special Master in the Bad Newz Kennels Case, 15 ANIMAL L. 69 (2008).
162. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-86n(c) (2019). Advocates are generally lawyers working pro-bono or
approved law students. Id.
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by the Department of Agriculture—“to represent the interests of justice.”163
Once appointed:
The advocate may: (1) Monitor the case; (2) consult any individual
with information that could aid the judge or fact finder and review
records relating to the condition of the cat or dog and the defendant’s
actions, including, but not limited to, records from animal control officers, veterinarians and police officers; (3) attend hearings; and (4)
present information or recommendations to the court pertinent to determinations that relate to the interests of justice, provided such information and recommendations shall be based solely upon the duties
undertaken pursuant to this subsection.164
According to the statute’s summary, the Advocate Act’s purpose is “[t]o permit the use of animal advocates in certain legal proceedings relating to neglected or cruelly treated animals.”165 Unlike Connecticut’s other animal protections, the Advocate Act is narrowly defined to only include cats and dogs
and specifically requires advocates to act in the interests of justice, rather than
the best interests of the animal (although the two interests hopefully coincide).166 Advocates should not be compared to a child’s guardian167 in welfare
or custody cases, but the animal advocates handle much of the work that overwhelmed prosecutors may not have time or resources for, such as conducting
research and interviews, preparing evidence for trial, or even making recommendations to the judge.168 From October 2016 to January 2019, Connecticut
courts appointed animal advocates in forty-eight animal abuse cases and the
state has seen a significant increase in punishments and fines against animal
163. Id. § 54-86n(a), (c).
164. Id. § 54-86n(b).
165. H.B. 5344, 2016 Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2016) (enacted).
166. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-86n (2019). An earlier draft of the Act stated that advocates should
act in the “animal’s best interests.” CONN. HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., OFF. LEGIS. RES. BILL
ANALYSIS, SUBSTITUTE H.B. 5344 (as amended by House “A”), 2016 Sess. (Conn. 2016),
https://www.cga.ct.gov/2016/ba/2016hb-05344-r01-ba.htm. This language was replaced with “interests of justice” for the enacted law. Id.
167. Connecticut laws regarding children’s representatives require the representative to advocate or
argue on behalf of the child’s best interest, which, as seen supra note 166, was rejected in the case of
the Advocate Act. See Nancy E. Halpern, Connecticut Advocates for Justice, Not Animals, FOX
ROTHSCHILD LLP (June 14, 2017), https://animallaw.foxrothschild.com/2017/06/14/connecticut-advocates-for-justice-not-animals/.
168. See Sullo, supra note 161.
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abusers.169
C. Pennsylvania’s Humane Law Enforcement Officers
Pennsylvania animal protection statutes include liability for (a) abandonment or poisoning of a dog,170 (b) neglect, cruelty, or overworking an animal,171 (c) taunting, tormenting, striking, or injuring a law enforcement animal,172 and (d) other specialized circumstances constituting abuse.173
Pennsylvania also prohibits animal fighting activities (including spectatorship) and any form of sexual intercourse with an animal.174 Animal protection
statutes generally exempt veterinary practice, research animals, wildlife, pest
control, and accepted farm animal husbandry practices.175
Pennsylvania’s animal cruelty code also includes a civil action provision
that empowers humane society officers—called Humane Law Enforcement
Officers (HLEO)—to initiate criminal proceedings against an animal
abuser.176 HLEOs are employed by humane societies,177 appointed by a court
169. Id. Prior to 2016, about 80% of animal cruelty offenses were dismissed or not prosecuted. Id.
170. 3 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 459-601(b), (c) (West 2019).
171. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5531, 5532, 5534, 5540 (2018). Although “animal” is not defined in
the animal cruelty statute, other listed definitions include protections for the following animals or
categories of animals: bear, bovine animal, bull, cat, cock, cow, dog, equine animal (including horses,
asses, mules, ponies, and zebra), fowl, goat, honey bees, pigeons, porcine animal, sheep, or other creature. Id. § 5531.
172. 3 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 459-602(a), (b) (West 2019).
173. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5535–5549 (2018). Other included circumstances include (a)
attack of a guide dog, (b) tethering an unattended animal, (c) transporting animals in a cruel manner,
(d) cruelty to a cow to enhance appearance of udder, (e) killing homing pigeons, (f) live animals as
prizes, and (g) assaulting an animal with biological agent. Id.
174. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5543–5544 (2018).
175. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5536, 5538, 5542, 5553, 5560, 5561 (2018); 63 PA. STAT. AND CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 485.32(4) (West 2019). Although veterinary practice in general is exempted, it is unlawful for a person to practice veterinary medicine on animals he or she owns. 63 PA. STAT. AND
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 485.32(4).
176. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5551 (2018); 22 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3708 (2018). For a generally comprehensive table of applicable state statutes and the powers granted to humane societies, see Cynthia
F. Hodges, Table of Enforcement Powers Granted to Humane Societies by State, ANIMAL LEGAL &
HIST. CENTER (2012), https://www.animallaw.info/topic/table-humane-society-enforcement-powers.
Many states allow humane societies to enforce animal cruelty statutes in some capacity. Id. A humane
officer’s authority will vary by state and could fall anywhere on the spectrum, from providing medical
care to seized animals to investigating and prosecuting abuse cases. Id.
177. In order to employ an HLEO, a humane society must be a nonprofit organization, and is usually
a 501(c)(3) charity funded by private donations. Elizabeth Anderson, Protecting Lassie, Morris and
Mr. Ed: Pennsylvania’s Evolving Animal Cruelty Statute, 89 PA. B. ASS’N. Q. 58, 60 (2018).
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to enforce (within a designated county) only the animal cruelty sections of the
criminal code, and have the power and authority to (a) investigate cases under
the animal cruelty statutes, (b) rescue or seize abandoned or mistreated animals, (c) apply for and execute search warrants, and (d) prosecute or assist in
the prosecution of animal abusers.178 Similar to Connecticut’s animal advocates, HLEOs lessen the burden felt by overworked prosecutors and understaffed police departments.179 Contrary to Connecticut’s animal advocates,
who merely assist prosecutors in animal abuse proceedings, HLEOs can command the proceedings from an initial report of abuse—reported to a humane
society’s dispatch team—all the way through prosecution.180 Training to become a qualified HLEO consists of forty hours of instruction pertaining to law
enforcement duties and forty hours of instruction pertaining to animal care
and accepted animal husbandry practices.181 While they have been helpful in
initiating and investigating animal abuse cases, most HLEOs are not properly
trained in the intricate aspects of police or legal work, such as application of
Miranda warnings or filing criminal complaints.182
D. Oregon’s Victim Classification
Oregon animal protection statutes include liability for: (a) inflicting or
encouraging animal abuse, neglect, or abandonment,183 (b) threatening injury

178. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5551 (2018); 22 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3708 (2018).
179. Diana Bocco, Pennsylvania SPCA’s Humane Law Enforcement Officers: What They Do and
Why, HONEST KITCHEN (Mar. 14, 2016), https://www.thehonestkitchen.com/blog/pennsylvaniaspcas-humane-law-enforcement-officers/.
180. Id.
181. 22 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3712(d) (2018).
182. Anderson, supra note 177, at 60. “Miranda warnings” refers to the case of Miranda v. Arizona,
in which the Supreme Court held that a defendant cannot be questioned by police in the context of a
custodial interrogation until the defendant is made aware of the right to remain silent, the right to
consult with an attorney and have the attorney present during questioning, and the right to have an
attorney appointed if indigent. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). If the HLEO does not properly provide a Miranda warning to a defendant, statements made by that defendant may be inadmissible evidence at
trial. See id. Because the HLEOs—and the humane societies that employ them—bear the costs and
liabilities of prosecuting a defendant under an animal cruelty statute, they cannot afford even the
slightest of legal mistakes. Jonas Fortune, Oversight of Humane Society Police Officer Position in
Lancaster County Not Clear, LANCASTERONLINE (Sept. 12, 2016), https://lancasteronline.com/
news/local/oversight-of-humane-society-police-officer-position-in-lancaster-county/article_e8da6f98-76d5-11e6-8222-cb2b131dfad6.html.
183. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 167.315, 167.320, 167.322, 167.325, 167.330, 167.340, 167.349 (2017).
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to an animal to coerce a person’s behavior,184 (c) assaulting a law enforcement
animal or interfering with an assistance, search and rescue, or therapy animal,185 and (d) unlawful tethering, horse tripping, trading in nonambulatory
livestock, or violating a standard of care for breeding dogs.186 Various animal
fighting activities and participating in or encouraging sexual activity with an
animal are also prohibited.187 The animal protection statutes generally exempt
veterinary practice, research animals, wildlife, accepted farm animal husbandry practices, slaughter, pest control, and rodeos.188
In 2014, the Oregon Supreme Court decided two cases that significantly
bolstered animal protections and could potentially initiate a plausible compromise for animal rights and animal welfare advocates.189 In State v. Fessenden,
the Oregon Supreme Court upheld a police officer’s seizure of an emaciated
horse without a warrant on the basis that exigent circumstances and an emergency aid exception justified the warrantless seizure.190 Although the court
184. OR. REV. STAT. § 163.275 (2017).
185. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 167.339, 167.352 (2017). A “search and rescue animal” is one that “has
been professionally trained for, and is actively used for, search and rescue purposes.” Id.
§ 167.352(3)(a). A “therapy animal” is “an animal other than an assistance animal that has been professionally trained for, and is actively used for, therapy purposes.” Id. § 167.352(3)(b). An “assistance
animal” is “a dog or other animal designated by administrative rule that has been individually trained
to do work or perform tasks for the benefit of an individual.” OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.143(1)(a) (2017).
186. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 167.343, 167.351, 167.374, 167.376, 167.383 (2017). “Tethering” refers
to the “restrain[t] [of] a domestic animal by tying the domestic animal to any object or structure by
any means.” Id. § 167.310(14)(a). “Nonambulatory livestock” is livestock that is “unable to stand or
walk unassisted” and trading in such livestock consists of “knowingly deliver[ing] or accept[ing] delivery of a nonambulatory livestock animal at a livestock auction market.” Id. § 167.351(1)(a), (2).
187. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163A.005(s) (West 2018); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 167.333, 167.355–
167.439, 167.341(2017).
188. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 167.315, 167.320, 167.332, 167.335 (2017). Exemption provisions do not
protect acts committed with gross negligence, however. Id. § 167.335. Accepted farm animal husbandry practices “include[], but [are] not limited to, the dehorning of cattle, the docking of horses,
sheep or swine, and the castration or neutering of livestock, according to accepted practices of veterinary medicine or animal husbandry.” Id. § 167.310(6).
189. Erica R. Tatoian, Animals in the Law: Occupying a Space Between Legal Personhood and
Personal Property, 31 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 147, 160 (2015); see State v. Fessenden, 333 P.3d 278
(Or. 2014); State v. Nix (Nix I), 283 P.3d 442 (Or. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d 334 P.3d 437 (Or. 2014),
vacated, 345 P.3d 416 (Or. 2015) (vacated for procedural errors).
190. Fessenden, 333 P.3d at 278. Because an animal is classified as property, any seizure by law
enforcement requires one of three conditions: (a) a warrant for entry and seizure, (b) a need for emergency aid, or (c) exigent circumstances. Id. The emergency aid exception applies when “the need to
render emergency aid or prevent serious injury or harm is an appropriate justification for an immediate
warrantless entry.” Id. at 281–82 (quoting State v. Baker, 260 P.3d 476, 481 (Or. 2011)). A situation
is exigent when it “requires the police to act swiftly to prevent danger to life or serious damage to
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admitted that “Oregon law still considers animals to be property,” it held that
“[d]omestic animals . . . receive special consideration under Oregon law” because they “occupy a unique position in people’s hearts and in the law.”191
The same day, in State v. Nix, the Oregon Supreme Court found that an
animal can be classified as a “victim” under the state’s anti-merger statute
after a criminal court found a defendant guilty of twenty counts of seconddegree animal abuse.192 Unfortunately, during sentencing, the trial court
merged the verdicts into a single conviction because “animals are not victims”
as defined under the Oregon anti-merger statute.193 On appeal, the court decided that the word “victim” in the anti-merger statute referred to animal victims when the defendant has violated the second-degree animal neglect statute.194 Although the defendant argued that animals are considered property of
their owners and therefore cannot be “victims,” Oregon’s Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, finding that the text, context, and legislative history
of the statute clearly demonstrated legislative intent to recognize the neglected
animals as the victims of the offense.195 Thus, contrary to mere personal property, an animal in Oregon can now be a legal victim of its owner’s abuse or
neglect.196
In the fall of 2018, the Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF) sought to test
the outer limits of the Oregon courts’ willingness to expand on this concept
of animals as victims by bringing a negligence claim on behalf on an abused
property.” Id. at 282 (quoting State v. Stevens, 806 P.2d 92, 98 (Or. 1991)). The court noted that the
emergency aid exception generally applies to humans while the exigent circumstances exception applies to animals as property. Id. However, the court concluded that both the emergency aid and
exigent circumstances exceptions applied in this case because the officer “reasonably believed . . . that
immediate action was necessary to prevent further imminent harm to and the death of the horse.” Id.
at 279.
191. Id. at 283–84.
192. State v. Nix (Nix II), 334 P.3d 437, 438 (Or. 2014) (quoting Nix I, 283 P.3d at 443).
The defendant was charged with twenty-three counts of animal neglect and seventy counts of seconddegree animal abuse, with each count corresponding to a different animal. Nix I, 283 P.3d at 443.
193. Nix I, 283 P.3d at 444. The anti-merger statute declares that “[w]hen the same conduct or
criminal episode, though violating only one statutory provision involves two or more victims, there
are as many separately punishable offenses as there are victims.” OR. REV. STAT. § 161.067(2) (2017).
194. Nix I, 283 P.3d at 449.
195. Nix II, 334 P.3d at 443 (“The phrasing of the offense [in the animal negligence statute] reveal[ed] that the legislature’s focus was the treatment of individual animals, not harm to the public
generally or harm to the owners of the animals.”).
196. Although Nix I was later vacated for a procedural error, the Oregon Court of Appeals adopted
the court’s argument in State v. Hess, 359 P.3d 288, 293 (Or. Ct. App. 2015), stating that “we nonetheless are persuaded by the Nix court’s reasoning on the merger question, and we adopt it.”
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and neglected horse named Justice, against his abuser.197 The district court
dismissed the case, but ALDF filed a notice to appeal the decision on January
22, 2019.198 The complaint, filed in the district court, alleged that when Justice’s previous owner surrendered him to an equine rescue, he was severely
emaciated and suffered from lice, rain rot, and genital frost bite and necrosis.199 Justice’s previous owner pled guilty to misdemeanor animal neglect
and was ordered to pay restitution for Justice’s past incurred medical costs.200
However, the complaint alleged that Justice continues to require extensive
medical care for the foreseeable future, if not for the rest of his life.201 Although Justice is currently living at a rescue, the fact that he will have continuous and substantial medical bills significantly decreases his opportunities to
be adopted into a permanent home.202 Represented by the ALDF, Justice is
seeking damages from his previous owner for future medical costs and pain
and suffering.203 According to the complaint, the ALDF will deposit any damages awarded into a trust—of which Justice will be the sole beneficiary—to
provide for his medical costs as long as possible.204
To provide necessary and standardized protections for animals across the
United States, Congress should build on the PACT and combine Connecticut,
197. See, e.g., Justice Complaint, supra note 1. Matthew Liebman, the director of ALDF litigation,
believes that this case is modest because they are “not seeking to establish federal constitutional rights
for animals.” Joyeeta Biswas, Horse’s Case Raises an Important Question: What Would Happen if
Animals Could Sue Us?, ABC NEWS (Aug. 23, 2018, 2:28 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/horsescase-raises-important-question-happen-animals-sue/story?id=57167970. This case, he argues, is
merely following the logical progression set in motion by Nix II. Justice Complaint, supra note 1, at
12. If an animal is considered a victim of animal neglect statutes, and victims can sue their abusers
for negligence per se, then theoretically, as a victim of criminal neglect, Justice should be able to sue
his abuser. Id. at 10–11.
198. Animal Legal Defense Fund Appeals Dismissal of Groundbreaking Lawsuit for Abused Horse,
ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND (Jan. 22, 2019), https://aldf.org/article/animal-legal-defense-fund-appeals-dismissal-of-groundbreaking-lawsuit-for-abused-horse/.
199. Justice Complaint, supra note 1, at 4–6. Justice was found at least 300 pounds underweight.
Id. at 4. His “penis was swollen, traumatized, infected and prolapsed, with a moderate amount of
necrotic tissue that had to be removed.” Id. at 5. Justice had also contracted penile frost bite, which
led to infection and scarring, and will most likely result in paralysis or the need for amputation. Id. at
5, 7. “Justice also suffered from lice and rain rot, a bacterial skin infection that irritates a horse’s hair
and skin and may result in a continuous painful sheet of scabbing.” Id. at 6.
200. Id. at 8. Defendant did not pay the court-ordered restitution before the deadline of August 10,
2017. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 7–8.
203. Id. at 13.
204. Id. at 8.
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Oregon, and Pennsylvania’s attempts at animal protection into a workable federal legislative measure.205
V. A PROPOSED FEDERAL SOLUTION
Despite America’s evolving perspective toward companion animals, society is probably not prepared for the potential ramifications accompanying a
decision to classify animals as legal persons.206 Professor Steven Wise diagnosed seven categories of issues that must be managed before society can extend comprehensive legal rights to animals:
(1) the physical problem—the sheer number of animals we kill and
exploit each day; (2) the economic problem—the size and extent of
industries that depend on the use of animals; (3) the political problem—the way in which our socio-economic fabric is interwoven with
the exploitation of animals; (4) the religious problem—the JudeoChristian tradition of human dominion over animals; (5) the historical
problem—the traditions of western philosophy and law with regard
to the status of animals; (6) the legal problem—the fact that animals
are categorized as property and therefore can only be the subjects of
others’ legal interests; and (7) the psychological problem—deeply
held beliefs about the proper relationship of humans and animals.207
In addition to the unsolved issues presented within Wise’s seven categories,
classifying animals as legal persons may be dangerous for the most vulnerable
humans in our society.208 Professor Richard Cupp argues against allowing
animal legal personhood based on animals’ cognitive abilities because including cognitive abilities in the standard of what makes a legal person will inevitably diminish protections for the least intelligent humans.209 Although Cupp
205. See infra Part V.
206. Geordie Duckler, The Necessity of Treating Animals as Legal Objects, 7 J. ANIMAL & ENVTL.
L. 1 (2016).
207. Burke, supra note 111, at 635–36 (citing WISE, DRAWING THE LINE, supra note 24, at 9–23).
208. See, e.g., Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Cognitively Impaired Humans, Intelligent Animals, and Legal
Personhood, 69 FLA. L. REV. 465 (2017) [hereinafter Cupp, Intelligent Animals]; Richard L. Cupp,
Jr., Edgy Animal Welfare, 95 DENV. L. REV. 865 (2018) [hereinafter Cupp, Edgy Animal Welfare];
Cupp, Litigating Legal Personhood, supra note 93.
209. See Cupp, Litigating Legal Personhood, supra note 93, at 594 (“But, over time, both the courts
and society might be tempted not only to view the most intelligent animals more like we now view
humans but also to view the least intelligent humans more like we now view animals.”); see also
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presents a slippery slope argument,210 to best avoid his proposed negative consequences, animal protections should be initiated by the legislature and enacted with due caution.211
Enacting a federal ban against animal crushing was a critical step toward
protecting animals, but the federal government can and should go further.212
Many state animal protection provisions are insufficient to properly address
the issue of animal cruelty, and states regularly do not have the resources to
enforce the statutes.213 Congress should look to the state animal protection
statutes for guidance and combine elements from different states to enact truly
effective and standardized protections.214 This Article submits a Proposed
Animal Protection Bill (Proposed Bill)215 in accordance with state statutes and
federal judicial requirements, which aims to include (a) general provisions
against animal cruelty (not limited to crushing), (b) a civil action provision for
criminal investigations, (c) an animal advocate provision for criminal prosecutions and civil causes of action, and (d) an animal suit provision for civil
Laurence H. Tribe, Ten Lessons Our Constitutional Experience Can Teach Us About the Puzzle of
Animal Rights: The Work of Steven M. Wise, 7 ANIMAL L. 1, 7 (2001) (arguing that requiring intelligence for legal personhood could lead to “genocidal and horrific” consequences).
210. A slippery slope argument rejects a course of action “because, with little or no evidence, one
insists that it will lead to a chain reaction resulting in an undesirable end or ends. The slippery slope
involves an acceptance of a succession of events without direct evidence that this course of events will
happen.” Slippery Slope, TEX. ST. U. DEP’T OF PHIL., https://www.txstate.edu/philosophy/resources/fallacy-definitions/Slippery-Slope.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2019). Cupp’s article, Edgy Animal Welfare, specifically addresses “slippery rhetoric and slippery slopes.” Cupp, Edgy Animal Welfare, supra note 208, at 865. Cupp argues:
Virtually all legal reforms providing stronger protections for animals have at least some
potential to contribute to the slipperiness of a slope that could cause society to slide downward into a harmful animal rights legal paradigm . . . . [B]ecause any time law evolves to
give more protections to animals it brings legal requirements regarding them at least a bit
closer to legal requirements regarding humans.
Id. at 869.
211. See Cupp, Human Responsibility, supra note 36, at 539.
212. See Chokshi, supra note 8; West, supra note 154.
213. Id.; see also 2018 U.S. Animal Protection Laws State Rankings, supra note 144 (ranking states
according to the quality of their animal protection laws).
214. See supra Sections IV.B–D, for discussions of such state provisions.
215. The Proposed Bill incorporates elements of both legal rights arguments and legal welfare arguments. See supra Section III.A (discussing animal rights and animal welfare arguments). The Bill
recommends granting an animal victim the legal right to sue his abuser, but also integrates animal
welfare policies allowing humans to protect animals from unnecessary suffering in a more paternalistic
system. See infra Section V.D (discussing legal rights for animal victims); infra Sections V.A–C
(discussing human participation).
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damages.216
A. General Provisions
The Proposed Animal Protection Bill builds on the animal crushing prohibition and recommends liability for (a) animal crushing, (b) general neglect
or cruelty to pet animals, (c) abandonment, (d) animal fighting activities or
spectatorship, (e) sexual activity with an animal, and (f) special provisions for
service, therapy, or law enforcement animals.217 Similar to most state statutes,
the Proposed Animal Protection Bill should also include exemptions for veterinary practices, research animals, wildlife, and accepted farm animal husbandry practices.218 The definitions of a pet,219 service, therapy, or law enforcement animal should be construed narrowly to limit frivolous lawsuits or
an overcrowding of courts.220 Maximum penalties should include citations,
misdemeanors, or felonies and a statute of limitations of two to four years
(depending on the maximum penalty level) would apply.221 Veterinarians

216. See infra Sections V.A–D. This Article combines general practices across many states in order
to propose a workable statute that is more likely to be enacted. See supra Part IV. Because many of
the states have already enacted similar provisions, the Author assumes that a national consensus has
generally been formed concerning the suggested provisions, and therefore, the proposal is probably
not too extreme to be enacted. See supra Part IV (describing the animal protection statutes of Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Oregon, some of which overlap and indicate a national consensus). This
Article also attempts to find a feasible compromise between granting animal rights and providing animal protections, in order to appease a wider range of animal advocates. See infra Part V.
217. See, e.g., Preventing Animal Cruelty and Torture Act, Pub. L. No. 116-72, 133 Stat. 1151
(2019) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 48); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-247 (2019); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
§§ 5531, 5532, 5534, 5540 (2018); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 167.315, 167.320, 167.322, 167.325, 167.330,
167.340, 167.349 (2017). For comprehensive compendiums containing the general animal protection
and related statutes in each state see 2018 U.S. Animal Protection Laws State Rankings, supra note
144.
218. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-247(b) (2019); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5536, 5538, 5542,
5553, 5560, 5561 (2018); 63 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 485.32(4) (West 2019); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 167.315, 167.320, 167.332, 167.335 (2017).
219. Compare KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6411(e) (2018) (defining a domestic pet broadly as “any domesticated animal which is kept for pleasure rather than utility”), with ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 7,
§ 3907(22-B) (West 2018) (defining a pet more narrowly as “a dog, cat, or other domesticated animal
commonly kept as a companion, but does not include tamed animals that are ordinarily considered
wild animals or livestock”).
220. See Animal Advocacy and Causes of Action, supra note 6, at 93.
221. See 2018 U.S. Animal Protection Laws State Rankings, supra note 144. Almost all of the states
impose a statute of limitations encompassing the range of two to four years. Id. Seven states do not
impose a statute of limitations for felony animal cruelty violations. Id. See generally Charging Con-
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should be immune from civil or criminal liability for reporting suspected violations of this statute.222 Similarly, civilians who remove unattended pet animals from a vehicle, in certain circumstances, should be immune from civil
or criminal liability.223 A defendant convicted of a misdemeanor or felony
violation would forfeit his or her animal(s) and would be prohibited from possessing an animal for five to fifteen years.224 Lastly, any animal that has been
abused, neglected, abandoned, or sexually assaulted by a convicted defendant
would be classified as a victim for purposes of civil liability.225
B. Civil Action Provision
The Proposed Animal Protection Bill should include a civil action provision that will allow humane societies to employ humane officers, similar to
Pennsylvania’s HLEOs.226 In order to employ a humane officer, a humane
society must be a nonprofit organization that is formed to prevent cruelty to
animals.227 A humane officer should be trained, at the expense of the officer
or the humane society, in acceptable animal practices and investigative procedures.228 The Pennsylvania HLEOs’ lack of legal training has proven to be
somewhat of an issue within the state’s system; therefore, contrary to Pennsylvania’s HLEOs, under the Proposed Bill humane officers would not have
siderations in Criminal Animal Abuse Cases, ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND, https://aldf.org/article/charging-considerations-in-criminal-animal-abuse-cases/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2019).
222. See Laws in Favor of Veterinary Reporting of Animal Cruelty, 2018 U.S. Animal Protection
Laws State Rankings, ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND, https://aldf.org/project/2018-veterinary-reporting/
(last visited Nov. 1, 2019). As of 2018, forty-nine states either require or permit veterinarians to report
suspected animal cruelty and generally grant civil immunity for reporting. Id. In stark contrast, Kentucky prohibits veterinarians from reporting suspected abuse. Id.
223. See Acts Against Leaving Dogs Locked in Hot Cars, 2018 U.S. Animal Protection Laws State
Rankings, ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND, https://aldf.org/project/2018-dogs-in-hot-cars/ (last visited
Nov. 1, 2019). As of 2018, thirty states and the District of Columbia have provisions related to leaving
animals in a motor vehicle. Id. Twenty states provide immunity for law enforcement or animal control
officers, or first responders who rescue an animal from a vehicle. Id. Fourteen states also provide
immunity for civilians who rescue an animal from a vehicle, under certain circumstances. Id.
224. See Laws Supporting Post-Conviction Possession Bans, 2018 U.S. Animal Protection Laws
State Rankings, ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND, https://aldf.org/project/2018-post-conviction-possessionban/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2019). As of 2018, thirteen states require a mandatory ban on possession of
certain animals after an animal cruelty conviction, and twenty-three states authorize a ban, but leave
the decision to the court’s discretion. Id.
225. See infra Section V.D.
226. See supra Section IV.B.
227. See, e.g., 22 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3702 (2018).
228. See, e.g., 22 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3712 (2018).
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the authority to prosecute abusers.229 General law enforcement procedures
dictate that the police officers respond to and investigate crimes before handing the evidence to the District Attorney’s office to prosecute a violator.230
Similarly, under the Proposed Bill, humane officers should respond to and
investigate instances of animal cruelty and provide evidence to the animal advocate to prosecute the violator.231
C. Animal Advocate Provision
The Proposed Animal Protection Bill should include an animal advocate
provision, combining the duties removed from the humane officer position
with those duties granted to Connecticut’s animal advocates, in any case
brought under the Proposed Bill.232 A federal department should maintain a
list of approved animal advocates who may prosecute the cases investigated
by humane officers, or who can be appointed when a court deems necessary
or upon request of a party.233 An animal advocate must be a bar-admitted
attorney in any state or a law student working under the supervision of an
attorney.234 Contrary to the Connecticut advocates, who merely provide assistance to the court and district attorneys,235 the advocates under the Proposed
Bill would work alongside a humane officer to build a case against the defendant, prosecute the case as a private attorney general, and present information or recommendations regarding sentencing to the court.236 Similar to
the Connecticut advocates, however, the advocates should act in the interests
of justice.237 When a defendant is convicted of misdemeanor or felony, the
advocate may continue to represent the mistreated animal in a civil suit against

229. See supra note 182; see also Anderson, supra note 177, at 60 (revealing an insider account of
the training of a humane society police officer in Pennsylvania).
230. See Symposium, Legal Standing for Animals and Advocates, 13 ANIMAL L. 61, 73 (2006).
231. See infra Section V.C.
232. See supra Sections IV.A–B, V.B.
233. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-86n(c) (2019).
234. Id.
235. See supra notes 161–68 and accompanying text.
236. See Legal Standing for Animals and Advocates, supra note 230, at 64.
237. See supra notes 166–67 and accompanying text. Requiring the animal advocates to act in the
interest of justice distinguishes animal advocates from children’s advocates and combats a perceived
slippery slope argument by providing an explicit difference in animal treatment compared to human
treatment. See Halpern, supra note 167.
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the abuser.238
D. Animal-Suit Provision
Through an animal-suit provision, the Proposed Animal Protection Bill
should grant animal victims a private right of action to sue their abusers, who
have been convicted of violating the Bill.239 First, by limiting this grant to
only the class of animals a court deems to be a victim of a crime prohibited
by the Proposed Animal Protection Bill, the animal-suit provision is clear and
precise enough to be upheld according to the Lujan standard.240 Because the
abuser has already been convicted, there is no doubt that the injury in question
will be sufficiently actual, concrete, and particularized.241 Second, the requirement of a causal connection between the injured party and the challenged
action of the defendant is also satisfied because the animal victim may only
bring a cause of action against its convicted abuser.242 The animal-suit provision is an explicit Congressional grant of a private right of action, but the
Proposed Bill should be written in a way that also adheres to Justice Scalia’s
Lujan test; therefore, even if a court denies the private right of action, the
animals will continue to satisfy the stricter injury-in-fact test.243 Thus, the
abused animals themselves will have standing in federal court to sue their
abusers.244
The animal-suit provision must also explicitly allow the animal advocates
to act on behalf of the animal victim, according to Rule 17(c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.245 Rule 17(c), through “next friend” representation,
provides a mechanism for representing a party who cannot speak for him or

238. See infra Section V.D.
239. See supra Section IV.C for a discussion regarding a victimized horse, Justice, suing his abuser.
240. Burke, supra note 111, at 651 (“The provision need only define the qualifying animals . . . and
relate them to the injuries protected . . . .”).
241. See Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“First, the plaintiff must have suffered
an ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” (footnote omitted) (citations
omitted)).
242. Burke, supra note 111, at 651.
243. See id.; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61.
244. See Burke, supra note 111.
245. See id. at 652–53.
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herself.246 In Whitmore v. Arkansas, the Supreme Court determined two requirements for “next friend” standing: (1) “an adequate explanation—such as
inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability—why the real party
in interest cannot appear on his own behalf,” and (2) “the ‘next friend’ must
be truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose behalf he seeks
to litigate.”247 For obvious reasons, an animal cannot appear in court on his
own behalf; therefore, the first requirement is satisfied. In order to ensure the
second requirement is also satisfied, the next friend must be an animal advocate who adheres to the requirements of the animal advocate provision.248 As
seen in Oregon’s Justice case, any awarded damages should be deposited into
a trust—of which the animal will be the sole beneficiary—in order to provide
for medical and rehoming costs.249
The combination of provisions within the Proposed Animal Protection
Bill would provide necessary standardized protections for animals to parallel
society’s evolving feelings toward animal companions.250 The Bill also implements an important system of remedies for animal victims, which complies
with judicial requirements, without straining the already overworked law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies.251

246. Id. at 653.
247. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163 (1990).
248. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 204 and accompanying text. Employing a trust for the animal-beneficiary discourages abuse within the system and ensures that any damages awarded will be spent on costs of care
and well-being for the animal-victim. See, e.g., Justice Complaint, supra note 1, at 6 (revealing how
Justice will use the money deposited in the trust).
250. See supra Part II for a discussion regarding Americans’ evolving feelings toward companion
animals.
251. See, e.g., Animal Advocacy and Causes of Action, supra note 6, at 92–95; Legal Standing for
Animals and Advocates, supra note 230, at 63–65.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Across the country, animal protection statutes are ineffective.252 Currently, the duty to protect animals is generally borne by each state, and many
of them cannot commit to the task.253 Animal shelters, humane societies, and
animal rescues—who pick up the state’s slack—are often overflowing with
animals who have been thrown away.254 Yet somehow, at the same time,
Americans are showing more empathy and care for animals than ever before.255 Organizations like the Nonhuman Rights Project and the Animal Legal Defense Fund expose this paradox by bringing extreme cases into the public eye.256 The legal organizations are not merely shining a light on animal
abuse and cruelty; they are presenting creative solutions to a generation that
thrives on knocking down walls and thinking outside of the box.257 This Article attempts to build on their momentum by presenting another creative solution and triggering further discussion within this growing area of law.258
The Proposed Animal Protection Bill explores animal advocacy movements and current legal restrictions to develop a viable compromise that grants
animals limited standing to remedy their injuries but maintains the distinction
between an animal and a legal person.259 Although this may be an underdeveloped framework, the basic premises are gathered from state systems which
can (and should) be monitored and adjusted to ensure efficient and effective
animal protections.260 A federal system, which standardizes protections and
encourages cooperation with states, humane societies, and effective animal
252. See Justin Marceau, How the Animal Welfare Act Harms Animals, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 925
(2018); Karin Brulliard, USDA’s Enforcement of Animal Welfare Laws Plummeted in 2018, Agency
Figures Show, WASH. POST. (Oct. 18, 2018, 8:12 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/science/
2018/10/18/usdas-enforcement-animal-welfare-laws-plummeted-agency-figures-show/?utm_term=.f
a98427d7ca7.
253. See supra Part IV; see also Jordan Fenster, Animal Cruelty Laws Are Ineffective and Outdated,
Advocates Say, LOHUD (Feb. 1, 2018 6:00 AM), https://www.lohud.com/story/news/local/2018/02/01/
animal-cruelty-laws-ineffective/1083847001/ (“Animal abuse and cruelty laws are hidden away in an
obscure section of New York’s legal framework . . . making enforcement and prosecution difficult
prospects.”).
254. The Pet Overpopulation and Overflowing Shelter Problem, ANIMAL MED. CTR. OF S. CAL.,
https://animalmedcenter.com/pet-overpopulation/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2019).
255. See supra Part II.
256. See supra Sections III.B.1, IV.C.
257. See supra Sections III.B.1, IV.C.
258. See supra Part V.
259. See supra Parts II, III, V.
260. See supra Part IV.
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advocacy organizations, is well equipped to better protect the animals we so
love.
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